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Abstract—Being motivated by recent developments in the 
theory of complex networks, we examine the robustness of 
communication networks under intentional attack that 
takes down network nodes in a decreasing order of their 
nodal degrees.  In this paper, we study two different effects 
that have been largely missed in the existing results: (i) some 
communication networks, like Internet, are too large for 
anyone to have global information of their topologies, which 
makes the accurate intentional attack practically 
impossible; and (ii) most attacks in communication 
networks are propagated from one node to its neighborhood 
node(s), utilizing local network-topology information only. 
We show that incomplete global information has different 
impacts to the intentional attack in different circumstances, 
while local information-based attacks can be actually highly 
efficient. Such insights would be helpful for the future 
developments of efficient network attack/protection 
schemes. 
Index Terms—Complex network, scale-free network, network 
robustness, intentional attack, distributed attack.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently there has been extensive research interest in 
studying large-scale real-world systems by formulating them 
into various network models. It is found that different systems, 
varying from Internet, world-wide web (WWW), airline 
transportation systems, food web, protein-protein reactions, to 
co-authorship, even terrorism organizations, when formulated 
into network models, sharing some stunning common features. 
Such observations give rise to a new area called complex 
networks [1, 2].  
The most important and most popular complex network 
model is probably the scale-free network [1, 2]. In such 
networks, the number of nodes with a nodal degree k is basically 
proportional to k α− . (For most real-world systems, the value of 
the exponent α  lies between 2 and 3 [1], the reason of which, 
however, remains largely unknown.). It is claimed that all the 
systems we mentioned above can be formulated as scale-free 
networks [1, 2]. 
 
This work was partly supported by Microsoft Research Asia (MSR-A) 
*Corresponding author (Phone: +65 6790 4552) 
 
There have been debates on whether the communication 
systems, especially the Internet, are indeed scale-free networks 
[3]-[5]. While most statistic results are showing scale-free 
nodal-degree distributions in communication systems, the 
argument is that the traceroute method (the method of sending 
traceroute packets to record the IP addresses of all the routers 
they have passed through) which we are using to sample the 
Internet topology, leads to biased statistical results [5]. Though 
the debates may not be resolved until a better sampling method 
is devised, it seems to be agreeable that at least the tracerouted 
part of the Internet, the part that the starting-node set can 
steadily reach, usually the part that matters most to the 
starting-node set as well, indeed forms up a scale-free network.  
Research on complex networks helps achieve better 
understanding of communication systems. One of the most 
important results reported is that the scale-free networks are 
highly robust to random failures (defined as network nodes 
failing one after another in a random sequence) yet fragile under 
intentional attacks (defined as network nodes being crashed one 
by one in a decreasing order of their nodal degrees) [6]1. In the 
Internet, though large-degree hub nodes typically are on the 
network edge instead of network backbone [8, 9], the removal 
of the hubs will nevertheless leave a large number of nodes 
disconnected from the network. The consequence, therefore, 
can still be disastrous.  
We are motivated to study the robustness of communication 
systems under intentional attacks from a complex network point 
of view. Specifically, we notice that in the existing results, to the 
best of our knowledge, two different effects have largely been 
ignored. First, complex communication systems such as Internet 
or WWW are so large, that no one really has the global 
nodal-degree information for executing an accurate intentional 
attack. Second, the real-world intentional attacks, if they can be 
executed at all, generally have to “propagate” through the 
network, attacking the neighborhood nodes adjacent to those 
“occupied” nodes step by step. And such attacks typically are 
based on local information of network topology only. In this 
paper, we call such kind of attacks the distributed attacks.  
We examine the above two effects through extensive 
simulations. It is shown that (i) different missed knowledge of 
 
1 Theoretical analysis on what kinds of networks are most tolerant to random 
failures and intentional attacks respectively can be found in [7]. As far as we 
know, however, there is no thorough discussion on whether these “optimal” 
networks can have wide real-world applications, and more importantly, whether 
they can emerge in self-organized extra-large systems.  
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 network topology has different impacts to the efficiency of 
intentional attacks. Hence hiding network-topology information 
may help strengthen network robustness under certain 
circumstances; (ii) on the other hand, distributed attacks with no 
global network-topology information can achieve very high 
efficiency, sometimes almost as efficient as the intentional 
attack based on accurate global information. 
Rest parts of this paper are organized as follows. In Section 
II, we study the efficiency of the intentional attack based on 
incomplete/inaccurate network topology information. A few 
distributed attack schemes are evaluated in Section III.  Finally, 
Section IV concludes the paper. 
II. INTENTIONAL ATTACKS BASED ON INCOMPLETE 
NETWORK-TOPOLOGY INFORMATION 
The robustness of a network is typically measured by its 
biggest cluster size (i.e., the number of nodes in the biggest 
connected node set versus the number of nodes in the whole 
network) and the cluster diameter (i.e., the average length of the 
shortest paths between all the node pairs in the biggest 
connected node set) under attacks [1, 2, 6, 10].  If a node has 
been attacked, we call it crashed; otherwise, we call it a live 
node. 
As mentioned before, the intentional attack is defined as the 
attack that brings down network nodes in a decreasing order of 
nodal degrees [6]. It is shown by extensive simulations [6] and 
theoretical analysis [10] that the scale-free networks are fragile 
under intentional attacks. To provide some examples, we 
simulate the intentional attacks in the well-known 
Barabási-Albert (BA) model with 10,000 nodes and 20,000 
links [1, 6] as well as a real-world Internet model containing 
6,470 nodes connected by 12,560 links [11]. In our simulations, 
we iteratively take down the largest-degree node in the current 
network until the network is broken into small pieces. It is 
shown in Fig. 1 that the BA model is crashed when roughly 
about 14% of all the network nodes are taken down, while the 
Internet model has an even lower “threshold of crash” at about 
2.7%. For comparison purpose, we plot in Fig. 1 the network 
behavior under random failures. We see that both networks are 
highly tolerant to such failures.  
To study the efficiency of intentional attack where accurate 
global information of network topology is not available, we 
consider two different cases as follows:  
• Due to incomplete knowledge of network nodal-degree 
distribution, a big hub is missed in the intentional attack. As 
an example, we test the special case that only the biggest 
hub is missed while all the other hubs are accurately taken 
down; 
• The big hubs are all taken down, yet some medium-sized 
hubs are missed in the attack. Specifically, in the BA 
model, we test the cases where the first 1% biggest hubs are 
all taken down and after that, 10% and 50% of the next top 
3% hub nodes (with nodal degrees varying from 12 to 23) 
are missed respectively. The same percentages apply to the 
simulations in the Internet model, where the degrees of the 
missed medium-sized nodes vary from 10 to 40.  
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(b) 6470-node Internet model 
Fig. 1. Robustness of the scale-free networks under intentional attack and 
random failure, respectively.  
The simulation results are presented in Fig. 2. We observe 
that missing the single biggest hub makes the intentional attack 
drastically less efficient. In the BA model, 21% of all the nodes 
have to be removed before the network goes crashed, denoting a 
7% increase in the threshold of crash. In the Internet model, the 
effect is even more significant. The threshold of crash jumps 
from a very low 2.7% to a rather high 30%.  The fragileness of 
the Internet model under intentional attack and this significant 
increase in the threshold of crash can be explained by the same 
reason: the Internet hubs are of very high degrees (The biggest 
hub has a degree of 1,458, while in the BA model it is only 
386.). Therefore the survival of a single hub may drastically 
enhance network connectivity. The lesson we can learn from 
such observations is obvious: it is worth all the efforts for the 
offending (defending) side to take down (protect) the big hubs.  
Missing a certain portion of the medium-sized nodes also 
degrades the efficiency of intentional attack, as we can observe 
in Fig. 2. Considering the fact that it is extremely difficult to 
identify all the medium-sized nodes in extra-large 
communication systems, we argue that the high possibility of 
missing some medium-sized nodes may indeed impose a threat 
 to the efficiency of intentional attack. Furthermore, comparing 
the results of missing 10% and 50% medium-sized nodes 
respectively, we argue that, for the defending side, in certain 
circumstances it may be in fact a more effective strategy to 
protect/hide as many medium-size nodes as possible rather than 
protecting the obvious targets of big hubs. 
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 (b) 6470-node Internet model 
Fig. 2. Robustness of scale-free networks under intentional attacks that miss (i) 
the biggest hub, and (ii) 10% and 50% of medium-sized nodes, respectively.  
Another interesting observation is that in the BA model, 
missing 50% medium-sized nodes actually leads to higher 
threshold of crash than that of missing the biggest hub (Fig. 
2(a)), which is obviously not the case in the Internet model (Fig. 
2(b)). This again can be explained by the relatively much lower 
degree of the biggest hub in the BA model: the impact of 
missing a degree-386 node, significant as it is, is surpassed by 
that of missing 150 medium-sized nodes with degrees between 
12 and 23. The impact of missing the degree-1458 hub in the 
Internet model, on the other hand, overweighs that of missing 97 
nodes with degrees between 10 and 40.  
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Fig. 3. The cluster diameters of the 6470-node Internet model under intentional 
attacks. 
Finally, the cluster diameters of the Internet model under 
various types of intentional attacks are shown in Fig. 3. We see 
that in most cases, the cluster diameters are significantly 
increased a long time before the network is crashed, making the 
network highly inefficient in supporting data communications 
though it is largely still connected. Such impacts can also be 
degraded when complete knowledge of network topology is not 
available, especially when a big hub is missed in the attack. As 
we can see in Fig. 3, when the biggest hub is not taken down, the 
cluster diameter actually never becomes too large during the 
whole procedure of attack, until the network is crashed. A 
similar conclusion holds in the BA model as well.  
III. DISTRIBUTED ATTACKS BASED ON LOCAL INFORMATION 
As mentioned before, the distributed attack can only 
“propagate” through the network step by step, attacking the 
neighborhood of some nodes that had been crashed before. 
Furthermore, the target(s) of the next-step attack is selected 
solely based on the local information of the degrees of the 
neighborhood nodes.  
We evaluate several different distributed attack schemes as 
follows: 
• Greedy sequential attack: the attack that chooses the 
largest-degreed live node adjacent to the node crashed in 
the last step as its next-step target. If no neighborhood live 
node exists, it randomly selects a live node as its target.  
• Coordinated attack: the attack that searches through all 
the live nodes adjacent to any crashed node and selects 
among them the largest-degreed one as its next-step target. 
If no such node exists, it randomly selects a live node to 
continue the attack. 
• Lower-bounded parallel attack: instead of taking down 
only a single node each step, it takes down in each step all 
those live nodes that are (i) adjacent to the crashed nodes, 
and (ii) with nodal degrees higher than a preset threshold. If 
no such node exists, the attack stops.  
Fig. 4 compares the efficiencies of the greedy sequential 
attack and the coordinated attack, respectively. It is shown that 
 the greedy sequential attack is not very effective in bringing 
down the whole network, whereas the coordinated attack, 
though based on local information only, achieves almost the 
same threshold of crash as that of the accurate intentional attack. 
This observation can be understood as follows: we have to take 
down a lot of low-degreed nodes in the greedy sequential attack 
since in many steps there are no big hubs adjacent to the 
just-crashed node. In the coordinated attack, each step we can 
choose the next-step target from a much larger number of nodes. 
Consequently we seldom need to attack a low-degreed node. 
The main drawback of the coordinated attack, however, is the 
rather complicated collaborations between all the attacking 
frontiers in order to find the best next-step target.  
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(b) 6470-node Internet model 
Fig. 4. The efficiencies of the greedy sequential attack and the coordinated 
attack, respectively.  
To eliminate the need for having complicated collaborations 
and information exchanges between all the attacking frontiers, 
we proposed the lower-bounded parallel attack, which arguably 
may better resemble the real-world attacks as well. To avoid the 
big burden of taking down a large number of low-degreed 
nodes, we set up nodal-degree lower bounds at 4 and 10 
respectively. A live node adjacent to a crashed node will not be 
taken down unless its current degree is strictly higher than the 
threshold.  
The simulation results are reported in Fig. 5. In the Internet 
model, setting the nodal-degree lower bound at 10 makes the 
distributed attack almost as effective as the accurate intentional 
attack. In fact, the threshold of crash is only slightly increased 
from 2.7% to 2.9%. If we set the lower bound at 4, more nodes 
have to be taken down before the network goes crashed (The 
threshold of crash becomes 4.8%.). On the other hand, fewer 
steps of attacks are needed since more nodes are taken down in 
each step. In the BA model, the observations are different: when 
we set the nodal-degree lower bound at 4, the threshold of crash 
is close to that of the accurate intentional attack (16% vs. 14%). 
When the threshold is set at 10, however, the attack will be 
terminated after 17 steps when the degrees of all the live nodes 
adjacent to the attacking frontiers are lower than the threshold. 
At that moment, the network is largely still connected.  
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(b) 6470-node Internet model 
Fig. 5. The efficiencies of the lower-bounded parallel attack with nodal-degree 
lower bounds set at 4 and 10, respectively.  
The above observations can be explained as follows: the 
large-degreed nodes in most complex networks form up a 
 connected sub-network. Therefore we could attack and take 
down this sub-network virtually without going through any 
low-degreed nodes. More significantly, to take down these 
large-degreed nodes, we actually do not need global information 
of network topology at all: local information-based attacks can 
penetrate through the whole sub-network thanks to the 
connectivity of it. To protect the communication systems from 
being crashed by such distributed attacks, it is crucially 
important to identify and stop the attack at early stage. As we 
can see in Fig. 5, the networks’ decomposition is slow at the 
early stage and then is tremendously speeded up after a certain 
number of steps. In addition, we argue that it is important for the 
offending side to select proper threshold values in such attacks: 
a too-low threshold makes the attack unnecessarily take down a 
large number of low-degree nodes, slowing down the attack and 
giving the defending side a better chance to react. A too-high 
threshold, on the other hand, makes the attack unable to crash 
the network, as shown in Fig. 5(a).  
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(a) Greedy sequential attack and coordinated attack 
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(b) Lower-bounded parallel attack 
Fig. 6. The cluster diameters of the 6470-node Internet model under different 
distributed attacks. 
Lastly, we examine the cluster diameters of the Internet 
model under distributed attacks. We observe in Fig. 6(a) that the 
coordinated attack quickly makes cluster diameter quite large; 
and shortly after that, the network is totally crashed. The greedy 
sequential attack, though not very effective in crashing the 
whole network, quickly makes the cluster diameter quite long 
(and hence makes the network no longer efficient in supporting 
data transmission) as well. Another interesting observation is 
that, under the greedy sequential attack, even after the network 
has been largely crashed with 9% network nodes removed, the 
cluster diameter remains close to 8, indicating the existence of 
some sparsely-connected clusters (which are of small sizes yet 
large diameters). In the lower-bounded parallel attacks, as we 
see in Fig. 6(b), the cluster diameter increases slowly at the 
beginning and then jumps high very quickly. Also we see that, 
when we set the lower bound at 10, the cluster diameter remains 
a constant value 12 after 19 steps of attacks. This large diameter 
belongs to a sparsely-connected 217-node cluster in which there 
is no node with a nodal degree higher than 10.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we examined the robustness of complex 
communication networks under intentional attacks. We 
considered different cases where the attacks are based on 
incomplete/inaccurate network-topology information and local 
information respectively. We found that incomplete information 
may degrade the efficiency of intentional attack significantly, 
especially if a big hub is missed. On the other hand, 
local-information based distributed attacks can be highly 
effective, sometimes almost as efficient as the accurate global 
information-based attack. Such insights, as we believe, will be 
the helpful for developing effective attacking/protecting 
strategies in the future complex communication systems.   
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